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A B S T R A C T
This article focuses on the emerging landscape for Alternative Transfer Methods (ATMs) in Colorado, USA. ATMs are developing within a legal landscape of water
rights governed by prior appropriation law, growing demand for water in urban centers driven by population growth, and an aging rural farm population whose most
valuable asset may include senior water rights. Rural-urban water transfers in the past have been linked to the collapse of rural economies if pursued to the extreme
extent of “buy-and-dry,” where water rights were purchased outright and permanently removed from agricultural land (e.g. Crowley County). This article focuses on
the emerging innovations of ATMs, which seek to accomplish the same purpose of providing additional water to growing cities but through more flexible me-
chanisms, such as rotational fallowing, interruptible supplies, and water banks, that aim to preserve rural economies as well. We review the history and context for
water allocation in Colorado, the history of rural-urban transfers, and focus on ATMs and their pros and cons. We conclude with implications of ATMs for water
governance and providing flexibility and sustainability in a changing climate.
1. Introduction
Competition for water in the arid western United States, including
the state of Colorado, has been a fact of life for over a century. As a state
that has adjudicated water rights for well over 100 years, and one that
has been at the leading edge of experiments with water markets,
Colorado’s experience is relevant not only across the western U.S. but
perhaps internationally as well for other arid and semi-arid regions
hoping to improve resiliency in the face of climate change and drought.
Located at the intersection of the Rocky Mountains and the eastern
plains, Colorado is known as a “headwaters” state because the majority
of its rivers originate within the state’s borders. This includes major
regional, national, and international rivers, such as the Colorado River,
Rio Grande, and South Platte. Settlers to this region from the east coast
of the U.S. in the 1860s developed a system of legally-based water
rights allocation known as prior appropriation that has persisted to this
day. Prior appropriation recognizes the right to use water as a matter of
priority date. Specifically, users that put water to beneficial use at an
earlier date have “seniority” over users whose first use came later in
time. In addition to priority, another fundamental component to prior
appropriation is that users must continue to beneficially use their entire
water right (because the right is for use of water, not actual ownership of
water), or they may risk forfeiting that right through what is known as
abandonment.
In the western U.S., and Colorado specifically, numerous challenges
face water managers as they attempt to balance supplies and demands
with a range of stakeholders, sectors, and ecosystems. In addition to
having some of the fastest growing urban centers in the country
(Colorado’s urban Front Range is projected to grow by 45% by 2050,
State Demographer’s Office)—and an overall trend from rural to urban
economies—the region has experienced climate and hydrologic changes
which threaten available supplies [22]. As temperatures in the region
continue to increase, water managers can expect increased demands,
earlier snowmelt and runoff, and an overall decrease in water avail-
ability [31]. Accordingly, effective water governance will become in-
creasingly important to mitigate the challenges of climate change and
population growth, and ultimately help societies grapple with funda-
mental supply and demand imbalances. Against this backdrop, water
allocated to agriculture is a seemingly easy target to help meet the
needs of growing urban populations.
Because many of the settlers in the 1800s were agricultural land
owners, the most senior water rights in the West are generally owned by
farmers and ranchers, with some (but not all) municipalities often being
latecomers to the table to obtain rights for their residents. As the po-
pulation of western urban centers burgeons, the pressure to reexamine
this allocation pattern has intensified. While agricultural landowners
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hold senior rights, and individuals are free to sell their water rights
(subject to court approval), cities exert significant economic and poli-
tical pressure to ensure they are able to supply their populations with
sufficient water out into the future. In purely volumetric terms, the vast
majority of water is allocated still to agricultural uses – whether for
food crops or animal feed. In addition, a decline in natural flows due to
human uses has had adverse effects on ecological systems, in some cases
drying up entire reaches during peak summer months.
As populations have grown and the drying of the western U.S. is
anticipated from climate change, economists have argued that water
needs to be allocated more efficiently through the functioning of a
water market, rather than relying on “centralized, bureaucratic control”
(pg. 439, Howe et al. [25]). Water markets have grown substantially
since the 1980s in the semi-arid West. Prices were higher for agri-
culture-to-urban trades than for agriculture-to-agriculture trades, and
ag-urban trades are rising more rapidly than the latter [4]. The value of
water traded in western U.S. water markets ranges from year to year but
was as high as $800 million in 2015, driven by a drought in California
causing buyers to seek more reliable water rights portfolios [41]. A
comparison of water markets across five countries found considerable
variability in water markets as evidenced by institutional foundations,
economic efficiency, and environmental sustainability [21]. Garrick
et al. [17] have examined water markets in large basins in the U.S. and
Australia to garner insights into how transaction costs interact with
efficient water market institutions. The authors discuss the importance
of avoiding institutional arrangements that create “lock-in” or path
dependency as they limit flexibility as conditions change. Further, in-
vestments in institutional transition costs–such as conflict resolution
reform or establishing water users associations – can prove effective in
reducing transaction costs.
Water markets, Howe et al. [25] argued, need to have flexibility in
allocation, security of tenure, information on true opportunity cost,
predictable outcomes, perception of a fair and equitable process, and
the incorporation of public values beyond individual water user inter-
ests. Water markets have been controversial and critiqued for their
inability to fully capture and express public values such as ecological
and cultural values [25,26,29]. Water transfers have resulted in impacts
on rural areas, such as erosion of the local tax base, degradation of the
formerly irrigated land, and threats to the economic health and lifestyle
of rural areas [28,36]. The economic disparity between the “selling”
area where the water rights originate and the “buying” area often result
in a “tradeoff not only between the level of agricultural activities and
alternatives made possible by the proceeds from water sales but be-
tween lifestyles and culture” (page 362, Howe [26]). In a court case
over water rights in an acequia system (dating from the 1800s in New
Mexico, USA), a judge rejected the inherent assumption that “greater
economic benefits are more desirable than the preservation of cultural
identity” (ibid).
However, the experience of the Murray-Darling Basin in Australia
suggests that with an appropriate institutional framework and plan-
ning, water markets can function well to deliver both environmental
outcomes and social goals [20], although the program is now being
revisited as criticism mounts that outcomes have not met these ex-
pectations [19].
Water markets and transfers have been growing, but remain con-
troversial, leading to a desire in some regions to try other mechanisms
of transferring the right to use water that might be able to preserve
social and environmental values while still meeting the growing de-
mands of urban areas. In this article we develop a case study of the state
of Colorado, examining how Alternate Transfer Methods (ATMs) are
being developed and whether they work to offer the flexibility and
economic efficiency of water markets while preserving social, cultural
and environmental values. Flexibility is a key element of building
adaptive capacity for water management under a changing climate
[15]. Public perception of the procedural equity and fairness of what
might seem like otherwise “rational” adaptation policies put forward by
state and local governments is likely to be another critical and con-
tentious area in the future [1]. While the programs discussed here
should still very much be considered experiments, we argue that much
can be learned about ways forward for addressing supply and demand
imbalances, climate change adaptation, and more sustainable govern-
ance by examining the experience of ATMs in Colorado.
2. A tale of two water markets in Colorado
In 2015, the total value of water transfers in Colorado was $79
million, representing about 73,000 acre-feet (one acre foot is equal to
the volume of water covering one acre of land one foot deep, or
1233.5 m3) of water traded [41]. As discussed below, the experience
with water markets in Colorado has been mixed [28].
2.1. Flexibility and Northern Colorado water conservancy District’s water
market
One water market in Colorado that has been viewed as relatively
successful in terms of efficient water governance and low transaction
costs is within the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District
(“Northern”) in northeast Colorado. Northern is a public irrigation
district that was created to help manage the Colorado-Big Thompson
(CBT) Project, which is one of the major transbasin diversions discussed
earlier. Somewhat unique in Colorado, Northern established a formal
water market allowing users within the district’s boundaries to vo-
luntarily buy and sell water “shares” each year [27,28]. A “share” is not
a specific quantity of water, but rather a proportion of what is available
each year, depending on that year’s snowpack and available surface
runoff. Proportional allocation schemes, as opposed to fixed allocation
schemes, have been suggested as providing greater institutional
adaptability [35]. In the Northern context, this type of scheme provides
resilience for water availability and for users of the system because it
ensures that the amount of water delivered to users is scaled to what is
available, allowing for automatic flexibility and responsiveness to en-
vironmental changes and access to at least some water by everyone on
the system. The alternative prior appropriation model, that some users
are prioritized to receive their full amount of water over others, means
that some users would go without shares entirely in a drought year.
The price of water in Northern’s market depends on numerous
factors including the type of use, time of year, and the quota prescribed
by Northern, which all means the price can fluctuate substantially inter-
and intra-annually. For example, during the 2013 water year the price
of one share fluctuated between $9500 and $18,500, demonstrating the
volatility of the market [23]. Despite short-term fluctuations, however,
the price of shares has continued to increase in the long-term, as mu-
nicipalities compete to purchase the often-cheaper agricultural supplies
within the district.
Additional features of Northern’s market further distinguish it from
other regions in the state. For example, the market within Northern’s
district does not require review by the state’s water court—something
that is required for most other water rights transactions and can often
lead to a long, drawn out process for transferring water rights. This
feature imparts flexibility and therefore resilience, as the system can
respond more quickly to changing needs of users. However, while these
features allow for a robust water market to operate within the district’s
boundaries, it is difficult to make direct comparisons to other regions
throughout the state.
2.2. Lower Arkansas valley water transfers: “Buy-and-Dry” in Crowley
County—a cautionary tale
Crowley County is in the southeastern part of Colorado, just east of
Pueblo along the Arkansas River. Formed in 1911 and farmed heavily
over the next several decades, the area thrived mid-century with irri-
gation provided by a network of ditches that move water from the West
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Slope via Twin Lakes Reservoir and Canal Company and the Colorado
Canal Company onto fields in the eastern plains [18] where farmers
grew sugar beets, tomatoes, onions and later melons. But chronic
droughts, like the Dust Bowl in the 1930s, combined with economic
stressors, such as ongoing debt, low commodity prices, and the loss of
the Sugar City beet plant in 1967, left some producers questioning their
solvency [38]. Until 1972, the Colorado Canal Company, which fed
Crowley farms, had in its documents a requirement that water and land
be sold together. Water speculators from the Crowley Land and De-
velopment Company, who purchased a majority of shares, went to court
and had the two severed [34]. They sold their water rights to growing
cities and municipalities like Pueblo, Aurora, and Colorado Springs,
through what is now called buy-and-dry.
As farms dried up from water sales, cascading effects devastated the
community. Buy-and-dry led to loss of tax revenue, decreased land
values, and businesses and schools closing, leaving the county today
with 3000 residents, half of the population at its height in the 1920s.
More telling, the number of acres irrigated has declined from 56,000 in
1968 just as water sales started to 2000 today [13,33]. Buy-and-dry can
unintentionally externalize the costs of growth in urban centers to rural
communities who have less diverse economic options [13,28,36].
Moreover, this case reinforces the point that water markets are not
panaceas for fragile economies with few economic options, and sug-
gests that other under large scale climate change, other types of reforms
may be needed. Still, today Crowley County is widely cited by state and
local communities as a parable of worst case outcomes should buy-and-
dry practices continue and, thus, has become motivation for new ex-
periments in water management.
3. Experiments with alternative transfer methods (ATMS) in
Colorado
3.1. The basics of ATMs
While it is true that the voluntary transactions of water markets
serve the interests of both buyers and sellers (as is the case with
Northern’s water market), the resulting loss of water and agricultural
production can bring a host of hardships for affected communities, in-
cluding remaining irrigators, those in agricultural support industries,
rural governments, and the general public dependent upon schools, law
enforcement, and other social services funded by tax revenues – as was
the case in Crowley County. Such transfers may also adversely affect the
environment and may be viewed as predatory in nature, with wealthy
cities and industries taking advantage of a financially stressed farmers
and small rural communities with limited resources. As shown in the
earlier case studies, the degree to which such characterizations are
supportable vary from case to case and are subject to interpretation, but
the fact remains that there is widespread interest amongst potential
buyers and sellers, policymakers, and other interested parties in moving
toward a better model of water management. That better model may be
Alternative Transfer Methods (ATMs).
The ATM terminology is used broadly to describe a host of newer
types of approaches to facilitate additional water transfers from rural
areas, but in a way that minimizes local impacts or, in some cases, even
produces local economic and/or environmental benefits (CWCB [9],
Table 1 from Colorado Water Plan 2015). ATMs typically differ from
buy-and-dry approaches in three ways: transfers are temporary, land is
not permanently taken out of production, and the irrigator (at least in
part) retains ownership of the water right. Central to this calculus is
that some water remains in use for irrigation at all times, while a
component of that water is transferred. Minimizing the pain in these
arrangements relies on incentivizing cost effective ways for farmers to
reduce use, with this “conserved” water being the subject of the
transfer.
Conserved water is usually produced in one of three ways. The
simplest of these is fallowing, which entails taking a given parcel of
land out of production for a given period, typically a year or entire
growing season. Often this is done on a rotational basis (e.g., one sec-
tion of every ten is fallowed each year), while other forms entail taking
lands out of production only in drought years or only in that part of the
summer irrigation season where water consumption is highest relative
to plant productivity (e.g., split-season fallowing). The other two
techniques keep all lands in production but save water either by crop
switching (i.e., replacing water thirsty crops with those using less
water), or some form of deficit irrigation, in which crops are given a
reduced amount of water on the premise that yields are likely to de-
crease in a proportion less than the amount by which water deliveries
were reduced.
Once conserved, water is then transferred to urban or industrial
users who compensate the farmer for expenses associated with equip-
ment, transaction costs, and/or lost revenues. Presumably, this becomes
a stable new revenue stream that supports rather than undercuts the
rural agricultural economy, while allowing cities and industries to meet
new growth pressures without looking to already overtapped rivers. In
some cases, ATMs are also seen as a vehicle for augmenting instream
flows, addressing drought emergencies, and dealing with potential
inter- and intra-state curtailments associated with priority-based river
administration.
All these applications are predicated on two frequently-occurring
conditions: agricultural water uses that are less sensitive to periodic
water shortages than other uses; and situations in which there are
higher economic returns possible for water used for municipal and in-
dustrial waters than the same amount of water used in agriculture. With
proper arrangements, these conditions can be a source of flexibility that
can be creatively exploited for mutual benefit. In practice, however, a
host of barriers have impeded the widespread application of ATMs in
Colorado.
3.2. The use of ATMs in Colorado
While ATMs are in use in Colorado, it is still easier for municipalities
Table 1
Types of ATMs in Colorado (excerpted directly from Table 6.4-1 Colorado
Water Plan, 2015, pg. 6–116).
Rotational fallowing: Rotational fallowing keeps land in irrigated production model
while systematically fallowing specific plots. A rotation occurs to systematically
fallow each plot in successive crop seasons.
Interruptible supply agreements: This type of ATM is between non-agricultural
water users and farmers, shareholders, or a ditch company. Water is temporarily
transferred from agricultural use to another use, such as municipal. Farms are
fallowed during specific periods of time, and water is leased to the end-user
based on the historical consumptive use portion of the water right.
Municipal-agricultural water-use sharing: This concept embodies a complex array
of options based on continued farming operations for all lands associated with
the sharing arrangement. Methods are used to reduce the consumptive use of
crops, which makes water available for municipalities by sharing the historic
consumptive use amount. Two main subcategories are continued farming and
deficit irrigation, where crop watering is strategically limited to save water for
other uses.
Water cooperatives: Although there are a number of ways a water cooperative could
work, only one concept has been tested in Colorado. This concept identifies
periodic excess water supplies that can be used for optimization in the system. It
includes use of surplus augmentation water and other supplies. The framework
involves mutually beneficial transactions that work within the existing system of
water rights so no injury occurs.
Water banks: A water bank acts as an intermediary or broker based on water supply
arrangements with owners of certain water rights. The bank could help avoid or
endure a compact curtailment for example. Irrigators would be paid to reduce
their consumptive uses, which could trigger fallowing of agricultural lands or
deficit irrigation practices on a temporary basis.
Flex Markets: These ATMs are defined as voluntary agreements between municipal
and industrial water users, and environmental conservation water users. The idea
is to change the use of a senior irrigation right to include multiple end uses in
addition to irrigation. These markets establish trading platforms to help provide
water used by all participants.
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to gain new water supplies through permanently fallowing agricultural
land [6]. As a result, through pressures of growth both within and
without the state, it has been estimated that Colorado could lose be-
tween 500,000 and 700,000 acres of currently irrigated farmland [10].
The state has articulated a goal of maintaining agricultural viability
while supporting agricultural conservation and efficiency [11]. In ad-
dition, agricultural communities are not only experiencing pressure on
their water supply from municipal and environmental needs, but are
also experiencing demographic changes in their communities that
threaten the workforce available for maintaining agricultural in the
state. As a result Colorado’s Water Plan not only seeks to find creative
ways of sharing agricultural water with urban areas, but also seeks to
implement programs to enable Coloradans to enter the agriculture in-
dustry [11]. The state has set a goal of sharing at least 50,000 acre-feet
of agricultural water using voluntary ATMs by 2030 [11].
The Colorado Water Plan (2015) highlights a number of examples of
ATMs underway in Colorado, including an arrangement between the
Morgan Ditch Company and Xcel Energy, the major utility in the state,
to lease water for Xcel Energy’s Pawnee power station. In dry years,
some of the farmland is fallowed to provide water for Xcel, and the rest
is irrigated with sufficient senior water rights. The City of Thornton has
also agreed to provide emergency water to another power company, the
Platte River Power Authority. A Water Banking Working Group is ex-
ploring water banking on a larger scale within the Colorado River
Basin. The City of Aurora has partnered with farmers to help purchase
more efficient watering systems, farmers have reduced consumptive
use, and Aurora has access to some of the conserved water. The City of
Aurora has also entered into an interruptible supply agreement with the
Rocky Ford Highline Canal group of farmers. These types of inter-
ruptible supplies allow for more flexible drought relief and recovery of
water supplies following drought. Ducks Unlimited is a non-profit in-
terested in preserving wildlife, and partnered with Aurora Water and
Colorado Corn Growers to implement wildlife habitat of interest. In the
Lower Arkansas Valley Water Conservancy District, irrigators organized
into the Lower Arkansas Valley Super Ditch Company which allows for
collective leasing of agricultural water and acts as a negotiating entity.
They are engaged in a pilot program to temporarily transfer water from
agricultural lands in the Catlin Canal system to municipal communities.
The state hopes to learn from this experimental ATM implementation in
the Arkansas basin. Castle et al. [6] summarize some of the discussion
among different participants with an interest in ATMs in Colorado and
find there are still many open questions, but there is strong interest in
the state continuing its leadership role in facilitating progress on dis-
cussion on ATMs. The state has also provided over $1.5 million to study
or pilot ATMs. These mechanisms – providing emergency water, linking
delivery of water to a different use depending on the climate conditions,
providing financing for upgrading efficiency while allowing use by ci-
ties, creating “interruptible” supplies, governing water in a negotiating
entity instead of as single owners–all provide new ways of introducing
flexibility, and therefore potentially produce adaptive capacity and
resilience in an otherwise legally rigid system.
ATMs are not without tensions however. Municipalities value the
permanence of water availability in the end [12]. The cost effectiveness
of ATMs is also important—rate payers’ willingness to support the costs
of creative arrangements and new irrigation infrastructure, for ex-
ample, may be limited. On the agricultural side, some farmers have
expressed doubt that ATMs will really become a viable alternative to
permanent fallowing of agricultural lands and are skeptical of partici-
pating as they fear ATMs may not be able to protect farmers’ water
rights in the end [37]. ATMs may provide stability in farm revenue but
some producers worry that they may miss out on years of high com-
modity value by participating in some of these programs [6]. The
question also remains about whether ATMs are scalable enough to be
able to reverse the trend of permanent fallowing of agricultural land.
Finally, as tools that work within the framework of prior appropriation
water rights, ATMs do little to resolve some of the doctrines
fundamental shortcomings, such as environmental protection. Inter-
ruptible supplies may be acceptable in some cases for balancing needs
of farms and cities but unacceptable for preserving fish and wildlife
who depend on river flows every year for survival. Ultimately, whether
or not mechanisms such as ATMs confer resilience to climate change
over the long term remains to be seen.
3.3. Challenges associated with ATMs in Colorado
A variety of barriers impede the development of well-functioning
western USA water markets, including those based on ATMs. Some of
these barriers are unique to the institutional and physical setting of
Colorado, whereas others are more widely applicable. The major bar-
riers to ATMs in Colorado are summarized below [9].
3.3.1. Changes in consumptive use
Under Colorado law, when water is sold and transferred to a new
user, the amount actually moved is limited to the historical con-
sumptive use and not the diversion amount. This is done to ensure that
other rights holders on the stream where water is diverted will ex-
perience “no injury”—i.e., no reduction in water availability due to the
transaction. Legally quantifying consumptive use occurs as part of a
“change case” in water court (or in a State Engineer-approved substitute
supply plan), typically supported by studies provided by water resource
engineers and past records documenting diversions and irrigation
practices (one of the reasons traditional and permanent water transfers
can be a lengthy process).
The challenge is two-fold, establishing consumptive use before and
after the proposed transfer. In both settings, a simple water balance is
usually applied:
− − =Amount Diverted Return Flows Consumptive Use
For many irrigation rights, the diversion amount is often measured
using a weir or other technology; however, the other two values can
only be estimated. Often this entails the application of models and ta-
bles calibrated with data such as acreage, soil conditions, crop types,
local climate conditions, and so on, all tailored to showing how changes
to the irrigation regime affect evapotranspiration (ET). Getting agree-
ment on these values can be very difficult.
Lurking beneath this technical challenge is a legal conundrum, often
referred to the “use it or lose it” doctrine. The doctrine is based on the
premise that the size of a water right is determined by actual past usage,
and if a rights holder for some reason decreases their amount of con-
sumption, then the size of a water right can be reduced accordingly. The
farming practices employed to conserve water for the ATM, by design,
reduce consumptive use, which means that participation in an ATM
may make the irrigator vulnerable to a water right reduction, thereby
negating any incentive to participate (see [39]). Such risks are common
in the western states where only a few states (e.g., California, Montana,
Washington and Oregon) provide any means for a water right owner to
retain some ownership of conserved water [14]. In Colorado, the as-
sumption is that conserved waters are to be returned to the stream and
made “subject to call by prior appropriators” (See Colorado Water
Conservancy District v. Shelton Farms, Inc. 529 P.2d 1321, 1325 (Colo.
1974)). The Colorado legislature has taken steps to alleviate these
concerns and provide needed certainty to both buyers and sellers in
ATMs, but doubts linger about how these issues might actually play out
in the legal system. Given some negative experiences with previous
buy-and-dry arrangements, such as Crowley County, public perception
of ATMs is an important consideration.
3.3.2. Infrastructure considerations
The range of possible water transactions is dependent on the in-
frastructure available to physically move water from one place to an-
other. In some situations, this is not a serious impediment: for example,
transferring an upstream water right to a downstream user can be as
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simple as letting the water flow downhill in the natural streamcourse.
However, if the seller is downstream of the purchaser, then the water
either needs to be physically transferred upstream, or it has to be “ex-
changed” upstream with another water source. In some settings, such as
Colorado’s South Platte Basin, very little exchange potential remains,
which suggests that new infrastructure—namely storage and pipeli-
nes—may be necessary to execute ATMs that otherwise are financially
and legally viable [8].
Part of the appeal, as well as the physical mechanism, of ATMs is
that they presumably would draw small percentages of water out of an
agricultural region’s water portfolio, leaving sufficient water in place to
maintain crop production. Pulling 5% of water from all agricultural
regions rather than 100% of water from 5% of those regions has dra-
matically better socioeconomic implications for rural areas. But doing
so requires highly distributed infrastructure. Lacking such, disastrous
buy-and-dry situations emerge, again as was the case with Crowley
County, which was facilitated, in part, by the presence of existing sto-
rage and delivery infrastructure [13].
3.3.3. The costs of doing business
Much of the promise of water markets hinges on the observation
that the economic value of water used in municipal and industrial (M&
I) is often dramatically greater than its value in agriculture [2]. M&I
users often have the financial resources to make such transactions
beneficial to participating farmers; however, cities do not wish to
overpay and farmers do not wish to undersell. Lacking information
about what constitutes an appropriate price can deter participation in
the market, especially for farmers who feel at a strategic disadvantage
to cities with the expertise and resources to research the market. With a
few exceptions (most notably, for water from the Colorado-Big
Thompson Project, discussed earlier), relevant transaction prices are
rarely available for comparison.
While determining appropriate pricing is a challenge to all water
transfers, including traditional buy-and-dry transactions, ATMs raise
two special complications. First, given the “partial” farming operations
associated with ATMs, and the frequent market-driven changes in crop
and livestock profitability, estimating the economic merits of leasing
arrangements can be particularly challenging for farmers. In recent
years, several tools have been developed to aid in these calculations
[7,5,30,39]. Presumably, more experimentation with ATMs, along with
efforts to better compile and publicly disseminate information about
market activity, will help establish appropriate pricing structures and
could overcome some reluctance to participation.
The other cost-related challenge is more fundamental and challen-
ging, and it speaks directly to some of the issues noted below. A sig-
nificant financial impediment to all water transfers is the transaction
costs—namely, the legal and engineering fees associated with pursuing
the change case in water court. Given that ATMs can modify diversion
amounts, consumptive use levels, and return flow volumes in ways that
are much more difficult to estimate than in a simple buy-and-dry ar-
rangement, the transactions costs of ATMs are generally assumed to be
“equivalent or higher as a permanent buy-and-dry” (CWCB [9]:9, citing
research from CCGA et al. [7]). For cities that might already be re-
luctant to pursue temporary rather than permanent exchanges, the
specter of added transactions costs is a significant additional barrier.
3.4. ATM experiences in the Lower Arkansas Valley
A recent analysis of the dynamics of drought decisions across dif-
ferent sectors along the Arkansas River demonstrates that Crowley
County has become an example of “creeping resilience” in the region
[24], a term that points to the fact that communities that have become
highly vulnerable to stressors can become an example over time of
decisions that might be avoided in the future. It is a slow resilience for
some outside the system built upon the unintended consequences the
arise from the vulnerability of others–namely buy-and-dry. ATMs are an
important example of alternative or adaptive measures, however ex-
perimental they might be.
Given the amount of water being bought by municipalities
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, efforts to end buy-and-dry practices
increased. The Lower Arkansas Valley Water Conservation District,
formed in 2002 through a ballot initiative, began a program to keep
water in the valley through conservation easements. In 2005, others
began to explore experimental leases, including rotational fallowing
programs, creating agreements between municipalities to lease water
from farmers who fallow fields for three of ten years at a specified
amount of money per share. In Otero County, an area adjacent to
Crowley, one pilot program, the Super Ditch, includes a collective of
seven canal companies that hope to demonstrate how such alternatives
might work on a larger scale [13]. Still, an important consideration in
the success of ATMs is the perceptions of success and value by those in
the agricultural community.
Attitudes about ATMs along the Arkansas River are mixed.
Henderson et al. [24] find that some agricultural producers express
enthusiasm about the possibility that ATMs affords, both as a con-
tinuation of a way of life valued by agricultural producers and as a
benefit to their individual businesses during times of drought. These
people see ATMs as a positive option for both the farmer, who gets
financial reimbursement, and the municipality, who gets supplemental
water, during times of drought. Some have gone so far as to suggest that
the Super Ditch has been popular among producers and has garnered
widespread interest across the state. In part, this willingness centers on
how experiments shift practices from buying to leasing, which means
producers can share water instead of selling it, thus keeping it in
agriculture. It is an effort that further emphasizes the agricultural
producers’ desires to keep control of the water right – and keep water
on farms – while still being able to work with water utilities to fulfill
their obligation to communities. Municipalities, on the other hand, are
less enthusiastic about leases because of potential costs for transfers and
risk tolerance related to securing permanent water versus short term
supplies [16]. Still, there is potential for ATMs to benefit both sectors.
As one local Arkansas Basin farmer noted of ATM’s potential as an al-
ternative to buy-and-dry, “If we can make [these experiments] work, it
will be a win-win situation for everyone involved. The farmers will have
something they can lease every year and cities get guaranteed water
supplies” [32].
But agricultural producers’ optimism is not simply about controlling
individual rights to water. It also potentially indicates an attitudinal
shift in the broader producer community, a desire to sustain agriculture
as part of the future of Colorado. Henderson et al. note that there is a
shift to a responsible community attitude, which is as much about the
heritage of agriculture as it is about the importance of considering
impacts of water sales on one’s neighbors who depend on collaborative
solutions in an interconnected system. ATMs may have also shifted
values from those that emphasize self-interest and self-reliance of in-
dividuals to a collective community of agriculture that requires com-
promise and self-sacrifice. This finding substantiates other literatures
that suggest Crowley County proved a tragic but useful lesson for all
along the Arkansas about how bad it can get [3,40,42]. Attitudinal
shifts may also permit flexibility in approaching how water arrange-
ments might be made in the future as climates change, as well. Thus,
ATMs potentially encourage a more holistic thinking about the kinds of
consequences and interconnections that exist in water transfers.
For those who are skeptical of ATMs, the reasons span a scale of
micro to macro. One problem with the lease-fallowing programs, for
example, is the effect on the land, especially the soil and its ability to
recover. The ground may not recover after lying fallow for a year or
more, with changes to the microbial health and other organic matter.
Another potential concern is the loss of clients for some farmers should
they sacrifice one crop as part of their lease agreements. And still others
worry about farm laborers finding new places to work and not returning
to those areas where ATMs could disrupt their seasonal jobs [24]. In
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these instances, then, an experiment that might generate compromises
in water use is not worth risks to an individual farmer’s productivity
and finances. In this way, decisions about water use in the West may be
seen as proxies for competing societal goals around continued growth,
changing cultural values, and the survival of particular ways of life and
livelihoods.
4. Conclusion
Despite all the promise of ATMs, the fact remains that their appli-
cation in Colorado has been slow and isolated. ATMs bring out deep
divisions among various water constituencies, with some parties ar-
guing that streamlined transfers and a broader adoption of ATMs is key
to avoiding buy-and-dry and protecting rural economies, while others
argue that ATM reforms only make it easier to accelerate the dry-up of
agricultural lands. In part, this is a question of differing philosophies,
but in part it is also a question of trust, particularly among some re-
sidents of rural Colorado. Some irrigators are fearful that ATM reforms
will be unduly shaped by urban and environmental interests, and by
senior water rights holders who feel that efforts to build flexibility and
administrative ease into transfers do so by removing the substantive
and procedural protections currently afforded to them in water court.
Some also fear that a focus on ATMs may do nothing to quell the trend
of transfer activity being concentrated in areas that have the “mis-
fortune” of being in regions that—due to geography, economics, and
the presence of infrastructure—are most desirable for Front Range
urban customers.
Given this reality, it is critical to acknowledge an important over-
arching impediment that is not often captured in the literature—namely
the political reality that ATMs are rarely anyone’s preferred option:
their “Plan A.” While those in the agricultural community generally
view ATMs as preferable to buy-and-dry, it is still less desirable than
having no ag-to-urban water transfers at all. Cities are generally eager
to avoid the bad publicity of buy-and-dry, but the fact remains that
ATMs are often not seen as offering the same level of reliability and
predictability as outright purchases, and can entail proportionally
larger transactions costs. Environmentalists and public interest ad-
vocates are often more focused on managing urban demands—for both
environmental and financial reasons—than promoting ATMs that ex-
pand urban consumption (and sprawl) and create a need for new in-
frastructure. Political leaders are also torn—attempting to facilitate
ATMs on one hand, while also working to maintain existing protections
for other rights holders and establishing new protections to those third-
parties historically impacted by transfers. Given this, it is not unusual
for the legislature to simultaneously consider competing bills that both
streamline and further regulate water transfers.
The future of ATMs in Colorado is uncertain. While there is clearly a
willingness to experiment with these mechanisms, and the state of
Colorado is showing strong leadership in setting a goal for 50,000 acre-
feet to be shared through ATMs by 2030, some remain skeptical and the
ability to scale widely is uncertain. It may be difficult to protect the
value of preserving agricultural and rural landscapes in Colorado in the
face of economic pressures to sell water to growing cities.
Experimentation with ATMs is being watched closely, while traditional
water transfers also continue apace. The Colorado State Water Plan and
the willingness of some agriculturalists and municipalities to engage the
experiment suggests a broad desire to preserve the state’s agricultural
heritage. There is no doubt that some are going to great lengths to
demonstrate that the water transfer mechanism can be made to work to
support social and cultural values. This period of experimentation is
providing valuable information on options for adapting to climate
change in the future in Colorado. Still, at this point, the answer of how
widespread a role ATMs may play in Colorado’s water landscape, or
indeed, nationally or internationally is incomplete.
As Garrick et al. [17] note, there is much to learn about the trade-
offs, path dependencies and institutional tradeoffs of water markets in
the future. Water markets are only one possible mechanism to confer
resilience on systems managing water scarcity under a changing cli-
mate. The experience of Colorado suggests that the political, social, and
historical context matter for designing effective water markets, and that
we should not necessarily expect to find a “one size fits all” design that
can be applied in the same way everywhere. Furthermore, we should
not see these mechanisms as remaining static over time but as learning
opportunities that we revisit, revise, and update as experience with
their impacts and effectiveness is gained.
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